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THE NORTHEAST, THE PUNJAB, AND 
THE REGIONALIZATION OF INDIAN 
POLITICS 
Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 
From the time of India's independence in 1947, cultural 
politics-whether in the demands for linguistic states, in the controversy 
over Hindi as the national language, or in the nativism of the "sons of the 
soil" -have deepened regional identities. Episodic movements have been 
both the vehicle of politicization and its inevitable result. The government 
has typically met cultural demands with vacillation and indecision-some- 
times by calculated neglect-only to be followed, in the face of prolonged 
agitation, by a combined response of force and accommodation. 
Regionalism is rooted in India's cultural and linguistic diversity. Projected 
in geographic terms, it is at the state level both an ethnic and an economic 
phenomenon. It is an expression of heightened political consciousness, ex- 
panding participation, and increasing competition for scarce resources. 
Competition by the state is for Central financial allocation and Plan invest- 
ment; for the individual, it involves access to education and jobs. Economic 
grievances-expressed in charges of unfairness, discrimination, or Center 
neglect-may be fused with cultural anxiety over language status and ethnic 
balance. It is this fusion that gives regionalism its potency. Language and 
culture, like religion, are at the core of an individual's identity and when 
politicized take a potentially virulent form. 
So long as most states were under the Congress party umbrella, conflict 
between states and Center, among states, and within states could be accom- 
modated within the framework of the party. Today, regionalism increasingly 
manifests itself through opposition to Congress in regional parties like the 
AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, the Akali Dal in the Punjab, and the 
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Telegu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, and in demands by opposition parties 
across the ideological spectrum for greater autonomy for the states. 
The demand for greater state autonomy-increased financial resources, 
decentralization of planning, more independence in administrative areas for 
which states are constitutionally responsible-reflects, at least in part, an 
aspiration to bring government "closer to the people." The arguments are 
familiar in the American context, for federalism by its nature is "an invitation 
to struggle." That struggle in India, however, is aggravated by gross regional 
disparities, both in levels of development and in rates of growth, such that 
the gap between more advanced and backward regions continues to widen. 
Disparities mean that the struggle between the states and the Center 
necessarily involves a struggle among states. All states do not share the same 
interests. More prosperous states, such as the Punjab, may resist redistribu- 
tion of income among states by the Center, claiming that they are being 
unfairly exploited or that they do not receive a fair share back for what they 
contribute to the national economy. Other states, like Assam, Bengal, and 
Kerala, claim to be victims of Center neglect and discrimination. The more 
backward states, especially those of the Hindi heartland, look to the Center 
to redress disparities. 
There are cross-cutting interests, and alliances among the states are likely 
to be ad hoc and temporary. Nevertheless, regionalism, as it expresses itself 
culturally and in the demand for greater state autonomy, is almost wholly a 
phenomenon of the non-Hindi speaking periphery, and it is this that contin- 
ues to arouse fears of national disintegration. The North-South dichotomy 
has also been underscored by the Congress party losses in the 1983 Andhra 
and Karnataka state assembly elections. Indeed, Congress (I) General Secre- 
tary C. M. Stephen viewed the March 1983 meeting of the three opposition 
chief ministers from the South as "highly dangerous because it panders to 
the rising regionalist tendencies. The meeting," he said, "seems to have set 
the stage for a north-south fight." 
The federal relationship involves a permanent tug-of-war, and "rising 
regionalist tendencies" are a predictable response to increasing centralization 
in both government and the Congress party under Indira Gandhi. Regional- 
ism will likely impose increasing stress on the federal system as state move- 
ments seek to restore greater balance, but it does not pose a threat to the 
integrity of the Union. While we may be witnessing a regionalization of 
politics in India, there are countervailing forces of national integration. The 
development of a national system of transportation and communications 
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and the growth and extension of a national market economy have increas- 
ingly bound India together. 
The economy, both in its agricultural and industrial sectors, is becoming 
more national in character, drawing all regions into an interactive web of 
mutual dependency. Power and water supply systems serve interstate re- 
gions, and a national system of rail and road transport carries agricultural 
produce and industrial goods across the whole of India. Labor migration 
and employment opportunities for the middle class have given India's major 
cities ethnic diversity. An all-India managerial elite, in government services 
and in private business, draws expertise from every region. The emergence of 
a national system of communication-the reach of newspapers, radio, cine- 
ma, and (more limited) television-has nurtured the growth of national 
consciousness, the sense of being Indian, and it penetrates to all but the 
most isolated villages, linking the Center with the periphery, the rulers with 
the ruled, in (at least ideally) a two-way flow of information. But greater 
interdependence sharpens consciousness of regional disparities and intensi- 
fies the struggle among states to protect and advance their interests. Greater 
national integration, ironically, may deepen rather than alleviate stress on the 
federal system. 
To say that India's national integrity is fundamentally secure is not to 
minimize the serious problems posed by disturbances in the Northeast and 
in the Punjab. These are strategically sensitive border areas, and prolonged 
agitation involves basic interests of national security. The government of 
India will do whatever it takes to bring these areas under control. In both 
Assam and the Punjab, the government initially pursued a policy of purpose- 
ful neglect ("constructive inaction") in hopes that the movements would 
burn themselves out. Instead, they have grown in intensity. More moderate 
agitation leaders are pressed by the extremists to harden their positions as 
options close and compromise becomes more difficult. Neither situation is 
beyond redemption, but how the government responds will have far-reach- 
ing implications for all of India. 
In the tribal regions of the Northeast, the government has faced periodic 
armed insurrections from the time of independence. The creation of Naga- 
land in 1963 and the reorganization of the Northeast in 1972, with the 
formation of Mizoram, were welcomed by most tribals. On the whole, 
insurgency has been contained, but guerrilla activity by various underground 
organizations has not been brought wholly under control. Tribal regions of 
the Northeast remain under a form of quasi-martial aw, reflecting both the 
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continuing danger of unrest and the strategically vulnerable nature of the 
region. The Chinese no longer provide arms and training to tribal insurgents, 
but the adjoining region of northern Burma lies effectively outside the 
control of Rangoon and is both a source of arms into the Northeast and a 
haven for guerrillas. 
In the late 1970s, clashes between the Indian Army and insurgents of the 
Mizo National Army grew in intensity, and the Mizo National Front, sup- 
porting independence for Mizoram, was outlawed in 1979. In Nagaland and 
Manipur, secessionist groups engage in periodic terrorist attacks against civil 
and military authorities. In 1982, for example, 20 soldiers were killed in an 
ambush in Manipur. The attack is believed to have been a combined opera- 
tion by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur and the National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland. The PLA also has ties with the new secession- 
ist Tripur Sena in Tripura. All of these are tiny and with limited support. In 
1980, underground elements in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tri- 
pura, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh formed the Seven United Libera- 
tion Army (SULA). The organization calls for the creation of an independent 
federation of the Northeast by armed struggle. At this point, there is no 
reason to believe that SULA has coordinated the disparate tribal secessionist 
movements or affected a link between Assamese and tribal discontent- 
much less that it has gained any substantial support in the Northeast. Never- 
theless, the prospect of a united insurgency, however weak it may now be, is 
unsettling both militarily and politically and gives added urgency to settling 
the problems of the region. 
The situation in the seven states and union territories of the Northeast is 
aggravated by the incursion of non-tribals onto tribal lands. Tribals-eco- 
nomically, culturally, and politically threatened-have responded in vio- 
lence. The problem, which goes back well into the British period, has been 
exacerbated over the past decade as a result of immigration from Bangla- 
desh and, to a lesser degree, from Nepal. In Tripura, the influx of Bengali 
refugees has shifted the ethnic balance and reduced tribals to a minority. 
Efforts to protect tribal lands and culture have not been successful, as the 
slaughter of 350 Bengalis in Tripura in June 1980 bears tragic witness. In 
Manipur and Meghalaya, student-led agitations against "foreigners"-Ben- 
galis and Nepalese-have taken their lead from the movement in Assam. 
The volatile situation in Assam is complicated by the unrest engendered 
by the occupation of tribal lands by both Assamese and Bengalis. Lalung 
tribals were responsible for the massacre of more than 1000 Bengali Mus- 
lims at Nellie during the February 1983 election violence. But tribal griev- 
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ances are directed as much against the Assamese, as clashes between Boro 
tribals and Assamese villagers clearly reveal. The Plains Tribal Council of 
Assam, with the probable support of a majority of the tribals, calls for the 
creation of a separate tribal state of Udayachal to be carved out of Assam. 
It is not tribal demands, however, but the "foreigner" issue that is the 
center of the political turmoil in Assam today. Immigration-primarily in- 
volving Bengalis from Bangladesh, most of whom are Muslim-has aroused 
Assamese fears that they will be reduced to a minority in their own state, if 
this has not, in fact, already taken place. The issue is political power. The 
conflict, rooted in the centuries-old love-hate relationship between Assam- 
ese and Bengalis, has been fueled in this century by Assamese apprehension 
that their language and culture are threatened. Bengalis have long dominat- 
ed Assam state administration, but the extension of their control over the 
economy since independence has stimulated demands-primarily by As- 
samese youth-for the protection of jobs for "the sons of the soil." Eco- 
nomic concerns have been compounded by grievances that the Center has 
neglected the state, grievances expressed in the current agitation by such 
slogans as "Assam is not India's colony." 
There is no way in this brief discussion, nor is it really necessary, to 
recapitulate the history of the Assam conflict. Suffice it to say that it was the 
discovery of "foreigners" -illegal aliens from Bangladesh-on the voter 
rolls in 1979 that was the catalyst for the movement that has engulfed 
Assam and confronted the Center with a seemingly intractable problem. Led 
by the All-Assam Students' Union and joined by other political organiza- 
tions, including the AII-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, the agitation has 
mounted in intensity and has come to embrace in its support virtually the 
whole of the Assamese-speaking population. The leadership of the move- 
ment remains in the hands of the moderates, but the Sweecha Sevak Bahini, 
an extremist wing of the All-Assam Students' Union, proclaims violence 
against "foreigners" as the only solution to the Assam problem. 
The conflict remains essentially ethnic, but it has taken an increasingly 
communal character as both Hindu and Muslim organizations have exploited 
mutual anxieties. Over the past three years' agitation, Islamic fundamentalist 
organizations, notably the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tabligh Jamaat, have be- 
come increasingly active among Muslims, while the Hindu nationalist Rash- 
triya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), warning that Assam is being overrun by 
Muslim infiltrators, has dramatically expanded its activities in the state. 
Center delay and Assamese intransigence have made a "solution" more 
difficult, and any settlement is likely to entail troublesome dilemmas. As- 
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suming that a compromise can be reached for the cutoff date on the accep- 
tance of immigrants to legal residence-sometime between 1961 as de- 
manded by the Assamese and 1971 as accepted by the Center-the 
problems of detection, deportation, and dispersal remain. 
Deportation would raise serious difficulties with Bangladesh. Moreover, 
the border itself is porous, and it would be as difficult to prevent the return 
of deportees as it has been to stem the flow of continued immigration, 
although the violence against Bengalis has probably slowed the movement 
across the border into Assam. Deportation-even it it were physically possi- 
ble-would likely generate serious communal tension throughout India. 
"Foreigners" include both Hindus and Muslims, and the forceable return of 
Hindus (typically described as "refugees") to Bangladesh is widely viewed as 
unacceptable-and it would be politically explosive. On the other hand, 
deportation of Muslims alone would deepen insecurity among Indian Mus- 
lims generally, no doubt to the electoral cost of the Congress party, and it 
would surely draw sharp criticism and possible reprisal from the Muslim 
world. 
Dispersal-that is, resettlement of immigrants outside Assam-has been 
held out both as an alternative to deportation and as a means to share the 
refugee burden. But the Constitution protects (with limited exceptions) the 
free movement of people, and it is unlikely that the immigrants would 
voluntarily uproot themselves for what would likely be an inhospitable re- 
ception elsewhere-although some are now doing so in fear for their lives. 
As we look to the next few years, there will be enhanced efforts to prevent 
any further influx of foreigners and to return those who do get through. But 
deportation and dispersal of those already in India are likely to be limited at 
best. If a settlement between the Assamese and the Center can be reached, it 
is likely to emphasize protective legislation and Constitutional safeguards for 
Assamese linguistic, cultural, and political identity. It would include, as the 
first priority, the detection of "foreigners" and their removal from the voter 
rolls. The map of the Northeast might again be redrawn, possibly with the 
creation of an Udayachal tribal state, adjustments in the border with West 
Bengal, and cutting off the Bengali-speaking Cachar district from Assam to 
become a Union Territory. That Cachar might become a noncontiguous 
district of West Bengal is a less likely alternative so long as the Communist 
Party (Marxist) is in power in Bengal. 
In a state of diminished size, an Assamese majority would be more easily 
assured, and cultural integrity could be buttressed by legislation making 
Assamese the medium of instruction in the schools and the sole language of 
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state administration. Employment reservations and restrictions on the acqui- 
sition of property by foreigners would provide greater economic protection. 
An agreement between state and Center for a more favorable finance and 
Plan allocation for Assam-possibly involving a "royalty" to the state on 
petroleum production-would go a long way toward redressing past ne- 
glect. All of these raise potential constitutional questions and carry the 
danger of contagion-that is, that demands for similar protection would be 
raised in other states or regions. 
The settlement of the Assam question is fraught with difficulties, though 
none are insurmountable. But what if a settlement cannot be reached and the 
situation continues to deteriorate? The Northeast already has the heaviest 
concentration of armed forces anywhere in India, and they are augmented by 
an array of paramilitary units. Given the strategic vulnerability of the North- 
east and its importance to the Indian economy as a major source of domestic 
petroleum, the government, in all likelihood, would be prepared to invoke 
the emergency provisions of the Constitution and to impose martial law if 
required to maintain order. Although martial law has never been imposed to 
quell domestic unrest, disturbed tribal areas of the Northeast have been 
brought under quasi-military rule by the Armed Forces Act. Under the Act, 
in any area declared "disturbed," military officers are empowered to shoot to 
kill, to destroy buildings, to arrest without warrant, and to enter and search 
any premises without warrant. Barring the most extreme circumstances, this 
power is likely to be used most sparingly and only in those localities where 
civil authorities are unable to maintain order. But in the most extreme 
circumstances, the Northeast could become virtually an occupied territory. 
The crisis in the Punjab is, like Assam, likely to be long term and far- 
reaching in its implications. It involves a combination of economic, cultural, 
and religious issues, and at its core is the identity of the Sikh community. 
The current agitation led by the Akali Dal, the party of Sikh nationalism, is, 
in part, a continuation of the earlier movement for a Sikh-majority state of 
Punjabi Suba and for the protection of Sikh culture, religion, and the Pun- 
jabi language. 
In 1966, the Center yielded to Sikh demands for a separate state, but the 
creation of the Punjab and Haryana left the question of Chandigarh, the 
capital, unresolved. The decision, taken in 1970, to award the city to the 
Punjab, with two northwestern Punjab tehsils (subdistricts) going to Harya- 
na in exchange was never implemented. This has become one of the major 
issues of renewed agitation, though the Akalis want Chandigarh now and the 
matter of the tehsils transfer to be decided by an independent tribunal. 
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Another major issue involves the allocation of river water for irrigation 
among the Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. The Akalis demand a greater 
share to meet the vastly greater needs of the Punjab, India's granary. This too 
would be placed before an independent tribunal. 
The Akali demands, embodied in the 1973 Anandpur resolution, include 
virtually complete autonomy for the state, leaving to the Center only de- 
fense, external affairs, communications, currency, and railways. This de- 
mand-short of the call for an independent Khalistan sought by the out- 
lawed Dal Khalsa-is more a talking point on Center-state relations than a 
serious aspiration, at least at this stage. But while few Sikhs today want 
Khalistan, the line between regional aspirations and support for secession 
could be crossed as extremists gain greater power. Other Akali demands 
address various grievances and express a basic concern for the protection of 
Sikh culture and religious values. 
Given the success of the Sikh community, their representation in the 
public services and in the military, and the wealth of the Punjab (with a per 
capita income more than twice that of the all-India average), there is little 
sympathy in India for Sikh claims of discrimination. In addition, much to the 
outrage of Akali extremists, most Hindus do not regard Sikhism as a sepa- 
rate religion, though they do hold the Sikhs in high esteem within the Hindu 
fold. 
The Center has accepted the more symbolic religious demands, including 
the declaration of Amritsar as a "holy city" and the ban on the sale of 
cigarettes and liquor within the vicinity of the Golden Temple. It has also 
indicated a willingness to consider the establishment of tribunals to adjudi- 
cate the territorial and water issues, but not until the agitation itself is called 
off. (The Center, its representatives have stated, will not negotiate with a 
loaded gun pointed at its head.) And in April 1983, against the backdrop of 
rising regionalism but with the situation in the Punjab at the forefront of 
consideration, the government established a commission under retired Su- 
preme Court Justice R. S. Sarkaria to review Center-state relations more 
broadly. 
The problem in the Punjab, as in Assam, is political power, and it is partly 
a question of ethnic balance. The Sikhs constitute some 52% of the popula- 
tion in the Punjab, and the balance is shifting against them as a result of their 
own success as a community. Entrepreneurial spirit has led to an out-migra- 
tion of Sikhs (there are more Sikhs in India outside the Punjab than within), 
while agricultural prosperity in the Punjab has drawn Hindu laborers into the 
state, some from as far as Bihar. 
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The political problem of the Punjab involves the exclusion of the Akalis 
from power. Indeed, when the Akalis were in power during the period of 
Janata rule at the Center, they did not press their demands. The Akalis had 
struggled for Punjabi Suba, but when their goal was attained, they found 
themselves excluded from power except for brief interludes of coalition 
government. The Akalis themselves were factionally divided and engaged in 
continuous internecine struggle, but the Sikhs, divided by sect and by caste, 
were not wholly behind the Akali Dal. Non-Jat Sikhs joined with Hindus in 
support of the Congress, and given the ethnic balance in the state, the effect 
was to exclude the majority of Sikhs, represented by the Akali Dal, from 
power. A succession of Sikh Congress chief ministers ruled the state, but 
without the confidence of the larger number of their own community. 
Political stability in the Punjab requires Akali participation in government- 
on their own if they can make it or in coalition either with the Congress or 
the opposition. The only times that the Akali Dal has headed a government 
has been with the coalition support of the formerJana Sangh and theJanata 
party. The BharataJanata Party (BJP)-even with its aura of Hindu national- 
ism-remains a potential ally, but the Sikh-Hindu communal distrust engen- 
dered by the current unrest may force the Akalis into political isolation. A 
settlement of the Punjab crisis and the prospect of shared power with the 
Congress could split the Akalis, driving a wedge between the moderates and 
the extremists. The Congress in the Punjab is divided, however, and its 
contending factions have played to various Sikh groups, including extrem- 
ists who have thereby gained increased leverage within the community. The 
agitation, while exposing the division among the Sikhs, has strengthened 
Sikh revivalism, heightened political consciousness, and broadened the base 
of Akali support, especially among youth. 
There is a basis for compromise in the Punjab, but the Center's delay, 
insensitivity, and ineptitude have strengthened the hands of the Sikh extrem- 
ists. And therein lies the problem, not just for the resolution of the current 
crisis, but for the future. The Sikh extremists are unlikely to be party to any 
settlement and may well raise the ante as the Center meets Akali demands. 
The key figure in the current agitation is SantJarnail Singh Bhrindranwale, a 
zealot, and it is unrest that has been his vehicle to power. Sikh revivalism has 
been stoked by his portrayal of the "Sikh nation" in danger, and there is 
widespread fear among Sikhs of merging back into Hinduism and of losing 
their separate identity. Sikh fundamentalism has been met by heightened 
Hindu consciousness and militant Hindus have organized the Punjab Hindu 
Surakshu Samiti (League for Hindu Protection). Sikh-Hindu relations in the 
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Punjab have rarely been worse or more volatile than they are today. A 
relatively minor incident (much less an act of desecration such as occurred in 
1982 when the decapitated head of a bullock was placed before a Hindu 
temple, an act as offensive to Sikhs as to Hindus) could provoke widespread 
communal violence that could spill over into neighboring Haryana and to 
Delhi. Sikh-Hindu rioting in Patiala in May 1983 began as a bazaar dispute 
over noise from a loudspeaker. It ended with police firings and the army on 
the alert to move in. 
Violence in the Punjab-whether it be communal or an Akali "holy war" 
for satisfaction of their demands-raises an ominous prospect. Punjabis, 
Sikhs and Hindus alike, have a well-earned reputation as a "martial race," 
and unrest will not be easily controlled. The capacity of the police or even 
paramilitary forces to control serious violence is limited, and the use of the 
army, given Sikh representation in the armed forces, would be a matter of 
great sensitivity.' 
Any settlement in the Punjab must involve a substantive, not just symbol- 
ic, response to Akali demands if moderate leaders are to retain their credibil- 
ity among Sikhs and if unrest is to be effectively controlled. But violence in 
the Punjab is unlikely to be wholly contained. On the defensive, Sikh ex- 
tremists could continue to use terrorism to maintain visibility as a political 
force in the Punjab and as a means of drawing support from among the 
most disaffected elements of the Sikh community. 
No settlement will come without costs. While Prime Minister Gandhi 
would surely win kudos for reaching a solution to the problem, it could 
mean serious political costs to Congress in Haryana and Rajasthan-with 
implications for continued Congress control at the Center-and could even 
precipitate violent reaction. For the states involved, the territorial and water 
issues are critical, especially the latter. Negotiations for a Punjab settlement 
must involve the affected states, and the settlement must be broadly accept- 
ed as fair if unrest is not to spread to other states. 
The implications of the Center response, whatever they may be, to Akali 
and Assamese demands will be far-reaching. Center delay in each case has 
made settlement both more difficult and more costly, yet failure to reach 
settlements soon will only deepen discontent in Assam and the Punjab and 
require ever greater applications of repressive force, surely a tragic conse- 
quence for the Indian democratic body politic. On the other hand, yielding 
to demands under pressure gives an efficacy to violence that carries the 
danger of contagion. Success in demands for protective legislation for lan- 
guage and culture and for greater state autonomy for Assam and the Pun jab 
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is likely to give impetus and strength to regional movements throughout 
India. This should not, as some fear, bring on the disintegration of the 
nation. But pressure for greater administrative and political decentralization 
will surely impose stress on relations between the states and the Center and 
among the states themselves as India seeks to redress the "distortions" of 
centralization and to achieve new balance in the federal system. 
Notes 
1. There is no evidence of support for Akali demands among the Sikh military, though 
there must surely be an element of sympathy. The Akali appeal to retired officers to rally 
to the cause drew little response. 
Among Sikh grievances is the belief that they are now subject to discrimination in 
armed forces recruitment. In order to make the military more generally representative of 
the population, a 1980 government order provides that recruitment be conducted pro- 
portionate to population by state rather than strictly by merit. The Akalis allege that the 
Sikhs, now numbering some 15% of the armed forces, will be the principal victims if the 
rule is applied. 
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